Labor Relations, Labor Relations Law and Public Policy by Montague, J. T.
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Labor Relations, Labor Relations Law and Public Policy"
 
J. T. Montague
Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, vol. 19, n° 4, 1964, p. 440-462.
 
 
 
Pour citer cet article, utiliser l'information suivante :
 
URI: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/027519ar
DOI: 10.7202/027519ar
Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 11 février 2017 10:33
Labour Relations, Labour Relations Law, 
and Public Policy 
J.TV Montague 
In this address the author explains how and why, légis-
lation in Canada appears to hâve cornpartmentalized its 
own activities within the labour market so that a number 
of législative efforts are continued through the economy 
tvith little relationship one to the other. * 
Assessment of « gaps » in industrial relations research with an eye 
to the needs of public policy leads one quickly to issues of first principle. 
Locating gaps, or spaces, between firmly established positions is a 
difficult task in a field so inadequately stocked with analytical break-
throughs. Areas for pillaging by research workers corne quickly to 
mind. But the perspectives of those working in the field vary so widely 
that it is next to impossible to list such areas in a way calculated to gain 
wide acceptance as a meaningful and organized onslaught on the 
unknown. Uncharted sorties into the field hâve been the rule, at times 
parading as the compromise required for inter-disciplinary work and, 
on other occasions, as the view of a particular breed of social scientist 
for others to gore at will. 
It seems ail too évident that behind the gaps so necessary to fill 
for policy purposes in industrial relations is an urgent and primary 
need for points of référence. The search for thèse within existing 
knowledge is difficult and not widely encouraged, but nonetheless 
needed to give meaningful purpose to industrial relations work. 
Many words hâve flowed from académie pens ascribing short-
comings to the légal procédures Canadian law settles on the practice of 
labour relations. Prodded by an ~ 
aversion to the undisciplined 
tinkering with the economy impli-
MONTAGUE, J.T., Director, Insti-
tute of Industrial Relations, University 
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cit in the law, the economist has time and time again sketched require-
ments of an effective bargaining process. The lawyer has agrëed that 
the law is not equipped to reach toward the goals he and the economist 
are convinced are uppermost in our society. Social scientists generally 
are at odds with the way law channels the social and économie pro-
cesses of industrial relations. 
Such académie unrest has failed to influence wider analyses of the 
economy. One resuit is that current research has been only mildly 
successful in shaking the faith of Canadian civil servants in existing 
processes. The failure of current analyses to influence actions of poli-
ticians is synonymous with frustration. 
This paper bridges research and public policy. The bridge appears, 
at best, to hâve been tentative and, on less happy occasions, a passing 
enthusiasm of the moment, and deceptively superficial. One must 
reach the rueful conclusion that research work and practice in industrial 
i dations are pôles apart in Canada. An impasse has emerged to 
handicap constructive thinking. The law has, if anything, become more 
inviting to académie attack. Research ideas in the field hâve, in spite 
of notable refinements,r been singularly repetitious and detached from 
the requirements for policy in récent years. 
The Impasse 
While research endeavours travel the road of the tolerated, legis-
lators continue to find existing laws to be reliable friends in times of 
need. The légal requirements now known are, at once, both so un-
bending and so easily manipulated, that labour relations laws seldom 
embarrass the politician with unsightly struggles ovër principle, or 
even leave him without a choice of action. 
Research workers hâve been diligent in encouraging manipulation 
and indifférence. The labour analyst has been strangely attracted to 
taxonomy in the fields of policy and law, in spite of the fact that he 
avoids such exercises like the plague in other phases of labour studies.2 
(1) Notably in the légal field, e.g. CARL GOLDENBERG, Report to the Lieutenant 
Governor of Ontario, March 12, 1962. 
(2) MILTON DERBER, W.E. CHALMERS and MILTON T. EDELMAN, «Types and 
Variants in Local Union-Management Relationships », Human Organization, Vol. 21 , 
No. 4, Winter 1962-63, pp. 264-270. 
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Perhaps more important, the literature is « descriptive and contentious » 
and at times narrowly circumscribed in its social and économie di-
mensions. 3 
On the other side of the impasse, récent changes in the law bear 
the mark of the administrator more distinctly than any imprint of the 
innovator. Amendments to the Labour Relations Acts of the provinces 
are with few exceptions 4 presented as means to make the purposes of 
the Act more readily realized;5 purposes, by the way, which were 
evolved in what now appears as the uncomplicated industrial relations 
atmosphère of more than a génération ago. The heart of the législation 
continues to be government aid to dispute settlement on the assumption 
that society as a whole is not prepared to tolerate undue strike action. 
The law in British Columbia goes so far in its search for administrative 
convenience as to deal with strikes that are « not illégal under the 
Labour Relations Act ».6 Newfoundland broke new ground in the 
same area only to the extent required to permit usual organizational 
activities 7. Ontario changed its Act in 1962 to make way for the more 
effective use of the tenets of the Act in the construction industry.8 
Protection for the principles of labour relations Acts has been both 
ingenious and far-flung. 
Part of the problem has been that originally we did not realize the 
extent to which compulsory collective bargaining would require changes 
in économie relationships. After some three décades of trial and error, 
we apparently hâve still not ensured to our satisfaction the full working 
out of the original ideas, or changes in the economy hâve raised 
difficultés. 
So uncrystallized are views on labour issues that few are moved to 
question the wisdom of meeting short term, and on occasion basic 
issues, with ad hoc législation. In one province comment was fa.vour-
(3) See SANFORD COHEN, «An Analytical Framework for Labour Relations Law », 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. XIV, 1960-61, p. 350. 
(4) E.g., Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1962; Newfoundland Labour Relations 
Act, 1963 ; B.C. Labour Relations Act, 1961. 
(5) E.g., excerpts from an Address During Dehate on the Speech from the Throne, 
by the Hon. L.R. Peterson, mimeo., Victoria, 1963, p. 18. 
(6) B.C. Labour Relations Act, Sec. 57, c. 205, R.S.B.C. 1960, as amended by 
c. 31, 1961. 
(7) Newfoundland Labour Relations Act, 1963, Sec. 43A, c. 82, s. 4. 
(8) Ontario Labour Relations Act, 1962, Sec. 90, 96, c. 68, s. 16. 
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able when changes in this fundamental area of législation proved short 
term, and were withdrawn when the crises which gave rise to the 
changes passed. 
The chronology of the sparse number of turning points in the build-
up of Canadian labour législation gives warnings that problems will 
émerge. The ideas in the législation were declared on paper in the 
forties, but hit upon in Canada and elsewhere during a period stretch-
ing from the 1900's to the 1930's. Even such straightforward « théories » 
of labour law as those derived from some form of économie determinism 
should raise some alarm about législative concepts which journey un-
altered through so lengthy a period of rapid change in the economy.9 
Framers of Labour Policy 
Canadian collective bargaining has grown and matured in a society 
that included ever-present conciliation procédures. The loss of working 
time among ail non-agricultural employées, which is one measure of 
strike problems among voters, has been proportiohately lower than in 
the United States and many other Western countries.10 However, the 
incidence of strikes measured in terms of the unionized labour force and 
days lost by union members reveals the Canadian unionist as strike-
prone relative to his counterparts in most parts of the world. As a 
resuit, the politician is faced with two convenient and uncomplicated 
référence points for labour policy. On the one hand, the extent of public 
involvement in strikes, in overall terms at least, does not give rise to an 
urgent continuing cause for concern in policy. On the other hand, a 
group of less than one-third of non-agricultural workers are seemingly 
ready users of the strike weapon.X1 The situation is not even complic-
ated, if the past is any guide, by non-union strike activity similar to 
that experienced in France or Italy. 
Over-all use of the strike lever in Canada, important though it may 
be at the industry or firm level, appears to work out at the practical level 
of public policy as something other than a pressure for positive in-
(9) E.g., C.O. GREGORY, humour and the Law, (New York, 1946), pp. 18-19. 
(10) A.M. Ross and P.T. HARTMAN, Changing Patterns of Industriel Conflict 
(New York, 1960), p. 32. 
11) See S.M. JAMIESON in J.T. Montague and S.M. Jamieson, eds., British Colum-
ia Labour Management Conférence - 1963, Institute of Industrial Relations, Uni-
versity of British Columbia, 1963, p. 77. 
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dustrial relations policy. In fact it seems to hâve the obverse effect. 
Policies of the past in minimizing strikes may well hâve grown from a 
désire to protect an infant union movement. But continuance of thèse 
policies in the présent has support in the unbalance of voter in-
volyement and a hard-hitting labour movement. The politician lias an 
open invitation to brush aside, in the least uncomfortable way, overt 
signs of industrial relations problems and to by-pass any probing for 
unseen issues. 
Discussions of the absence of the strike and its effect on the délicate 
intrigues of bargaining are irrelevant to short-term thinking at the 
political level. To the politician, aware of a direct relationship between 
the discomforts of office and the incidence of strikes in the working life 
of the electorate, the thought of any unpredictable change in the strike 
picture is too troublesome to contemplate. Even the assessment of the 
problem made above is sliced into eleven parts by jurisdiction to further 
reduce the concern of any one législative group. 
It may be that the economist is justifiably skeptical of the absence 
of the catalytic action of the strike in disputes. The process of obscur-
ing industrial unrest we now follow so assiduously may heighten conflict 
when it does emerga1 2 Or the conciliation processes may unduly 
harden positions so that disputes are lengthened in time and made more 
complicated in strategy.1S 
Such arguments turn inward on the effectiveness of the industrial 
relations process. But framers of labour policy look outward from 
industrial relations to the needs of the economy. 
Orientation for Labour Policy 
Public policy will be only marginally concerned with the fact that 
the law and the gênerai législative attitude limits the effectiveness of 
industrial relations. But policy implications grow with the conviction 
that reduced effectiveness of industrial relations has significance for 
the economy. Industrial relations singly is a second-rate core of interest, 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) H.D. WOODS, «Canadian Collective Bargaining and Dispute Settlement 
Policy », Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, Vol. 21, (November 
1955), pp. 447-65, 531-3. 
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for it represents little more than the structuring of the way in whieh 
labour and management work together given the variety of social, 
économie, légal and other parameters which shape the relationship. 
The first-rate core for analysis is industrial relations as one of the 
many parameters of our social and économie system. This élevâtes 
industrial relations to a level where concern for its functioning is 
difficult to ignore. 
So far little has been done to evaluate industrial relations after the 
fashion of other parts of the eeonomy. Analysts are quick to indicate 
inadequacies in monetary and fiscal policies, but slow, or adverse, to 
appraise the usefulness and effectiveness of industrial relations policy 
to the eeonomy. Research endeavours hâve stopped short of en-
couraging the originator of labour policy to assess the wide swath his 
policies eut through the eeonomy or even providing adéquate tools for 
the purpose. 
This is a surprising omission, if only because the economist has 
been subjected to continuing frustration in theoretical and practical 
analyses affected by labour bargains, particularly in the area of price-
wage analyses. European expérience with wage policy within the 
broader context of national économie policy since the war has been 
anything but reassuring for the economist. Wage negotiations hâve 
more often than not proven the inadequacies of économie knowledge to 
meet the challenge of industrial relations. Even with the free-wheeling 
use of econometric analysis in the économie policy of Holland, the thrust 
of wage negotiations has made itself felt. Professor Pen holds, in con-
tradiction to the position taken by B. C. Roberts in making a similar 
appraisal in the United Kingdom, that Dutch labour policy has been 
partially successful in altering wage patterns to conform with the 
interests of the Dutch eeonomy.14 The European countries would seem 
to hâve removed any doubt as to whether or not knowledge in the 
labour market stands up to the level of understanding of other price and 
product markets. 
Economie analysis has ail too often reserved a place among the « on 
balance » items for industrial relations. « On balance », thé analysis 
nins, such items are self-eliminating in analysis leaving a hard core of 
(11) T. P'N. «The Strange Adventurcs of Dutch Wage Policy», British Journal 
of Industrial Relations, Vol. I (1963) , No. 3, pp. 318-330. 
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concem for monetary and fiscal policy. Attractive though this position 
may be, it has in the past lacked empirical support and is losing out to 
accumulating évidence. 
The question to be asked is how does current labour policy in 
Canada influence our economy through the vehicle of industrial 
relations. What in the structured industrial relations System imposed 
by the law is of économie significance? For Canadians more than 
Europeans, and perhaps even more than Americans, this question has 
added significance. The Canadian labour movement, apart from some 
early and eminently successful sections, grew in the shadow of the 
law. The majority of unions eut their teeth in Canada on problems of 
labour law and were influenced by the expérience both in structure and 
policy. 
Economists, lawyers, unionists and businessmen hâve been so caught 
up in the workings of the law that it is in the same area of law that they 
hâve sought to fathom industrial relations. It is the unanimity with 
which this common meeting ground has appealed to ail sides that has 
made it difficult for the research worker to grope his way towards 
asking questions of purpose and effect. Existing processes hâve been 
dissected almost exclusively in terms of the objects of existing Acts. 
The analyst has viewed his understanding of elaborate models of 
such phenomena as priées, interest rates, growth, social organization, or 
légal enactments as convenient tools for working out vehicles for social 
objectives. But industrial relations through the failure to question its 
purposes remains self-justifying, simply to be understood, not appraised. 
The economist, like other social scientists, balances at the edge of 
collective bargaining, fearful lest économie policy will become twisted 
in the unpredictable machinations of bargaining, and reluctant to venture 
through this additional demand for refinement of analysis. The in-
dustrial relations analyst, for his part, has occupied much of his time 
stressing the extrême unpredictability of his field, an effort sure to 
further isolate his work from the wider considération. 
Economies of Existing Labour Policy 
In the score of years since the wartime addition of compulsory 
collective bargaining to the Canadian economy profound changes hâve 
taken place in the methods of determining labour compensation. The 
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intégration of the apparatus for compulsory bargaining into the 
opérations of the economy hâve given rise to some uniquely Canadian 
innovations. 
At birth, compulsory collective bargaining in Canada was already 
over-shadowed by preconceived notions which had some forty years to 
gain priority. The required shape of the union-management relation-
ship was, in fact, prejudged. The over-riding concern of the législation 
was to limit overt conflict. Canadian labour law brought together for 
the first time two aspects; compulsory bargaining as a means of 
establishing unions and compulsory conciliation as a means of keeping 
a rein on them. It was a new-found game of checks and balances. 
Even though the legislators of the day were driven to face union 
récognition squarely, the demands of wartime conditions favoured 
continued préoccupation with disputes which now could conceivably 
arise. Conditions since the war, as noted above, hâve done to change 
the rationale of the legislator's position than the conclusions upon which 
labour policy is built. 
The législative purpose of stalking conflict has itself been 
exhaustively stalked in analysis. But little has been said about the 
structure imposed on industrial relations by this gesture of pré-
occupation with conflict. Much remains to be said about the conflict 
cycle and the économie effects of législative timing of longterm con-
clusions in industry. 
Negotiations and Bargaining 
Canadian law limits its concern to labour-management conflict. 
Negotiations over contract changes are rigidly separated from the broad 
sphère of collective bargaining.15 In this way the law is confmed to a 
much smaller. segment of concern than Dunlop's concept of an industrial 
relations System. After designating disputes during the contract term 
illégal, and thereby removing one potential area of concern, the lé-
gislation is centred on negotiations. Attention is concentrated on the 
usa of power at the time when policy for the « web of rules » is being 
set at the work place. The law points, and the parties hâve followed, 
to a mould for industrial relations which gives a periodicity to the 
process and a concentration of effort about the negotiations. 
(15) CARL M. STEVENS, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation (New 
York, 1963), pp. 1-3. 
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The market System represented by industrial relations is subject to 
public policies which are at odds with those followed in other économie 
markets on at least two levels. First, there is a contrast with the more 
usual search for stability which has been a primary objective of many 
other phases of économie policy. Labour law in seeking to avoid 
conflicts has institutionalized conflict and set its regularity. 
Second, public policy twisted the market forces until the existence 
of a market is in doubt. Steps hâve been taken in public policy, for 
example, to ensure the effectiveness of a lengthy list of commodity 
markets. The purpose has been to ensure that such markets are 
fragmented, responsive to change, and as free as possible from im-
pediments to entry. The industrial relations market appears as an 
enigma in this context. The law has bestowed on this single market 
éléments of monopoly, restricted opportunities for responsiveness, and 
has abridged in many respects access to the market. 
In part, the differing attitude to the industrial relations market is 
an effort at accommodation of the individual worker and the potential 
abuse of his minuteness in the market. The workers' agglomerative 
step in establishing unions for collective bargaining over the relation-
ship of the worker and his employer received the stamp of social ac-
ceptance. But there is little value in singling out purposes if the manner 
of fulfilling them minimizes the operational effectiveness of the new 
instrument once it has been established. 
Industrial relations channelled, or at least strongly propelled, 
toward a mould of periodic negotiations necessarily involves added 
areas of imperfection to the industrial relations market. The mono-
polistic bent to the industrial relations market has been discussed at 
length.1B But Canadian practice seems to hâve interfered with the 
market on two counts. The protection of the worker through the gua-
rantee of his right of association is, of course, fundamental. Judging by 
the conventions and recommendations of the International Labour 
Office on freedom of association 17 Canadian law falls short of idéal 
standards, principally in the areas of universal coverage, protection 
(16) GEORGE H. HILDEBRAND, «Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws », 
Public Policy and Collective Bargaining, Joseph Shister, Benjamin Aaron and 
Cîyde W. Summers, eds., Harper & Row, New York, 1962, pp. 152-181. 
( 17 ) International Labour Office. Freedom of Association and the Protection of 
the Riglit to Organize, (Geneva, 1959), pp. 58-61. 
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from extra-legal action and freedom of entry. Such déviations were 
criginally justified in terms of institutional and operational continuity.18 
This was undertaken as a cost of compulsory collective bargaining. 
What was not underwritten, or possibly understood, at the time was 
the second area of définition given to the institution of collective bar-
gaining by the close surveillance maintained on conflict. 
Législative désignation of overseers of negotiations has focussed, 
almost glued, attention to negotiation and conflict. Firm, and large-
ly irrévocable, answers are demanded of the process on designated oc-
casions which may or may not permit the industrial relations market 
so laboriously built to carry out its task. 
The criticism has been that the manner of shaping the ground rules 
for negotiations together with the act of designating the parties to nego-
tiations hâve reduced the potential for collective bargaining. Concen-
tration on negotiations squeezes from the collective bargaining process 
ail efforts save those directed to the division of the spoils of économie 
endeavour. It means intensive market activity during periods of nego-
tiations which are legislatively pointed with ail haste in the direction 
of binding answer. 
Yet the economist has long since demonstrated the value of con-
tinuity at the market place and warned of the potential dangers of 
discontinuity. Constant revision of the equilibrium position to meet 
changes in the market are significant, in the view of the economist, in 
the allocation of resources. 
If the économisas warning is translated into the terms of industrial 
relations it would seem to indicate a potential failure to realize the 
full market value of the labour-management relationship. The point 
of the économisas analysis is that not ail market influences make their 
way through to influence the existing equilibrium at any given time. 
Labour-management Co-operation 
Belated and limited récognition of the confinement imposed on the 
labour-management process can be recognized in government labour 
policy. A procession of efforts hâve been made to encourage labour 
( 18 ) PETERSON, op. cit. 
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and management to fill the virtual void between negotiations and col-
lective bargaining. 
The only continuous push toward fîlling out the labour-manage-
ment relationship has corne in the form of promotion by the fédéral 
government of labour-management committees. This effort had its 
beginnings during the last war. Actually the first efforts were forma-
lized by order-in-council dated just one month before the passage of 
P.C. 1003.19 This step, probably unintentionally, reflected the ingrained 
doubt of policy-makers that the compulsory collective bargaining P.C. 
1003 was to launch nationally would be more than negotiations. 
This promotional activity still continues and reveals at least two 
prédilections of policy-makers, first a narrow view of the issues covered 
by bargaining as elicited by the law, and second the conviction that 
there are a variety of issues which labour and management can discuss 
to the betterment of the economy. Wartime production needs were a 
ready challenge to widen the scope of the labour-managemnt relation-
ship. Since then, problems of safety, production, absenteeism, fire pré-
vention, hâve been suggested as peacetime challenges. The curious 
part of the program is that action is put forward as a venture separate 
and apart from the labour-management relationship so carefully struc-
tured under industrial relations law. 
Policy-makers hâve been reaffirming their doubts in récent years. 
The work of the Productivity Council was heavily weighted with labour-
management endeavours over and above the negotiation level20 Even 
the much wider scope of the présent Economie Council is, through the 
processes and the personnel involved in organization, referred to ïabour-
management considération. 
The question to be asked is whether the obvious dissection of the 
bargaining relationship at the policy level is consistent with a meaning-
ful collective bargaining system at the operational level. Conflicting 
answers to such a question are possible, but only tentatively supported 
by available analysis. Returns on bargaining over issues other than 
« bread and butter » items hâve been significant, particularly as shown 
by a number of examples in the United States. The same examples, 
(19) P.C. 162 (January 18, 1944) and P.C. 1003 (February 17, 1944) 
(20) National Productivity Council, Second Annual Report 1962-63, Ottawa, 1963. 
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however, contain warnings that bargaining has built-in frontiers of 
compétence. Much remains to be known of the inter-relationship of 
private bargaining activities and wider économie objectives. 
Labour Standards 
The cumulative effect of décisions by policy-makers in the labour 
field demonstrates with greater force the fragmentation of industrial 
relations. Work in the labour standards field has been piecemeal in the 
sensé of being without pattern or any clear-cut relationship to market 
processes. Far too little is known about the way in which the economy, 
labour standards and collective bargaining fit together. Neglect of this 
field is common to analysts and policy-makers alike. Policy-wise, the 
approach has been that the state has a responsibility for ensuring mini-
mum conditions of employment. The unspoken addendum to this 
policy has been that the free right of contract available to the individual 
and his organization would carry working conditions high enough to 
permit setting labour standards consistent with human needs, but low 
enough to inconvenience only the niggling employer of the sub-marginal 
opération. Standards législation ranges from simple application of this 
concept of minima to the more sophisticated extension principle applied 
to bargaining under Québec législation. 
Without exception labour standards législation substitutes socially 
acceptable décisions for dissatisfactions with the realities thrown up by 
the labour market. Such expressions of a nation's social conscience are 
commendable and, on most counts, probably necessary. There is ample 
évidence, however, of discomfort, confusion and, most regrettably, « do-
goodism» in this field. One must turn, in part, to industrial relations 
for analytical assistance, and again few leads are available. 
Professor Bora Laskin pointed to the issue in the opening of his 
Report to the Ontario Minister of Labour of the Committee of Inquiry 
into the Industrial Standards Act.21 The Committee appraised the 
impact of the Act as « not . . . a means of fixing 'iair* wages, but rather 
it has tended toward prevailing union rates ». Other uses of union 
rates in the labour standards field undoubtedly exist at the more or 
less informai level, especially in the area of fair wages. 
(21) Report dated July, 1963. See p . 1. 
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The Laskin Committee found, in spite of its conclusion at the em-
pirical level, only an oblique référence to trade unions in the Industrial 
Standards Act of Ontario. Since the Committee appears to hâve been 
offered no acceptable alternative to standards législation it suggests 
taking unions in their représentative capacity into the decision-making 
processes of the Act.22 Institutional problems which may arise out of 
the competing activities of unions are recognized and illustrated from 
expérience under the Québec Collective Agreement Act.23 But the 
exercise of straightening out the législation takes the only path current 
knowledge provides with any assurance and gambles that bargained 
compensation prevailing in one section of an industry will likely be a 
valid compromise in another section. 
Cari Goldenberg in his Royal Commission Report on Labour 
Management Relations in the Construction Industry 24 turns the tables 
and suggests the use of minimum wages to work out a difficult industrial 
relations problem.25 In effet he recommends the use of techniques 
from the uniquely centralized labour markets of British Columbia to 
the more diffuse and larger markets of Ontario. 
Professor Crispo, in his comments on the Goldenberg report, points 
to the suggestion for the use of a minimum wage as avoiding many of the 
problems of industrial standards législation.2G 
Essentially it avoids the décision the Laskin Committee took as 
to the validity of décisions made in one section of an industry for 
another. Crispo feels such a décision would be out of place in the 
construction industry. His argument in favour of the minimum wage 
position of the Commission, however, stresses the importance of déci-
sions made ini bargaining. 
Professor Sheila Eastman attacks the labour standards logic of the 
construction report on wider économie grounds.27 She reflects on the 
(22) Ibid., p. 39. 
(23) Ibid., p . 51. 
(24) Report to the Lieuteuant-Governor of Ontario, March 12, 1962. 
(25) Ibid., p. 75. 
(26) JOHN H. G. CRJSPO, «Labour-Management Relations in the Construction 
Industry : The Goldenberg Report », Canadian Journal of Economies and Political 
Science, Vol. XXIX, No. 3, p. 361. 
(27) SHEILA EASTMAN, «An Economie Analysis of the Goldenberg Report» , 
Canadian Journal of Economies and Political Science, Vol. XXX, No. 1, Feb. 1964, 
p. 116. 
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économie wisdom of the wage recommendation for the industry and 
balances the labour issues of the industry with the level of économie 
activity in the gênerai economy. 
A summation of analyses in the labour standards field leads to a 
half world of social purpose and économie manipulation. There would 
appear to be an overriding feeling that bargaining should make décisions 
less onerous in the standards field. This feeling becomes obscured in 
the realities of a labour market which may be dominated by concern 
for collective bargaining, but not controlled by what goes on at the 
bargaining table. 
Our society has underwritten an industrial relations process to 
structure industrial relations. Apparently confused by events in areas 
of non-conformity, society as represented by the framers of labour 
policy has kept to one side the potential corrective weapon of labour 
standards. The weapon can be used for commendable social efforts, 
but the more it interfères with the labour market the more likely it is to 
require considération of the implications for the economy. It is the 
uneasy feeling that the second potential may be at hand that has given 
rise to the concern of Professors Eastman and Crispo. The single safety 
valve available seems to be in the economically respectable décisions 
reached within the context of the industrial relations system. The 
theoretical hitch lies in how to marry the two areas and at the same time 
retain the conveniently viable vehicle of labour standards. 
Labour policy in Canada, apart from the example of the Québec 
Collective Agreement Act and the unintentional realities in the use of 
industrial standards Acts, is to enforce a rigid séparation of industrial 
relations and standards législation. Within labour departments, func-
tional divisions are frequently made among personnel on the basis of the 
two types of législation. The decision-making process, as the Laskin 
Committee found, largely sets aside the representational functions of 
unions. But provincial labour groups, as in récent expérience in British 
Columbia, participate significantly in the discussions of minimum wage 
Acts. 
The conclusion is unavoidable that labour standards législation is 
one more area in which industrial relations has a rôle to play, undefined 
it is true, but simply not realized. Again, the conclusion is inescapable 
that industrial relations, which has been painfully injeeted into the eco-
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nomy, has been limited to loculi within the economy where its potential 
languishes. Without a full return on investment in the revision of the 
economy implied in the adoption of compulsory bargaining, the labour 
standards field will continue to miss an economically defensible place in 
labour law. Indeed, labour law will continue to be a two-headed and 
incongruous whole. 
Union Organisation 
Unanswered questions about industrial relations law are not con-
fined to the bargaining level. Unspoken invasions of union structure 
guarantee the continuance of the conflict mould. Policy of govemment 
in the area of internai union affairs is, in principle, one of non-inter-
ference. In practice, the union as an institution is unlikely to be left 
unaltered by industrial relations policy, or in this case the absence of 
policy. At the first level the union will structure itself to cope with the 
mould of periodic conflict. Energies will be channelled into negotia-
tions almost to the exclusion of digging deeply into the potential or the 
limitations of industrial relations. The international structure of unions 
may well be sustained, in part at least, by the need for the widest 
possible base of support to cope with the mould of conflict. Unions in 
Canada hâve almost as a partial requirement of their opérations become 
far more adept in the manipulation facets of their work, such as in sub-
stantiating positions or conducting strikes, than in facing the outer limits 
of the labour-management relationship. Little energy can be spared, 
and the atmosphère of awaiting the next conflict is scarcely conducive, 
for a union to set its sights widely. Unions in Canada seem to hâve 
become of necessity almost exclusively instruments of negotiations and, 
at the same rime, objects of abuse for giving économie responsibility 
only marginal attention. 
A second level of observation reveals a further worrisome lack of 
government policy or even a consensus of views. The law has put 
limits on certain intégral parts of union activities with an eye to the 
potential threat to the mould of conflict rather than with a view to the 
potential of the union fulfilling its rôle in the economy. In the extrême, 
the way it has been necessary to move indeterminately through the 
Seafarers* issue, or even that the issue reached reality, demonstrates the 
lack of policy and research work. Or on another front, the total failure 
to corne to grips with the phenomenon of picketing is disturbing. 
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Professor A.W.R. Carrothers has held that common law doctrines 
are ill-equipped measures for judging events in an industrial relations 
context.28 One could document widespread discontent with législative 
answers in the area of picketing. Professor Carrothers notes, for exam-
ple, with respect to the British Columbia Trade Union Act of 1959, that 
there has been widespread feeling that it unduly restrained free speech. 
He suggests this antagonism might be offset by a saving provision as 
in the Newfoundland statute which permits communications other than 
by picketing. But picketing, particularly for organizational purposes, 
has yet to be appraised as a part of the industrial relations processes. 
The prédisposition of the moment is to treat picketing as disruptive by 
définition to the mould of conflict. 
Thèse hâve been two examples at the extrême. So long as in-
dustrial relations law is centred on conflict, the techniques of bar-
gaining will be measured as techniques of negotiation. In fact, in 
various parts of Canada the techniques of union organization and 
opération are so confined in the limitation of the approach to unions 
through conflict that union effectiveness at ail levels has required a 
parade of ingenious, but nonetheless outlandish, alternatives. In British 
Columbia, the use of motherless and fatherless mystery pickets, the 
accomplishment of distributing unauthored and unprinted copies of 
« line-ups » at football games, and the sudden concentration at a non-
union store of low-paid workers ail with twenty dollar bills as tender 
for ten cent items, must reveal a misappropriation of precious talent. 
Possibilités for Innovation 
It is incongruous, or even dangerous, to undertake a moulding 
process without first installing a safety valve. Otherwise the desired 
end-product may be destroyed. Safety valves are absent or effectively 
sized up in bargaining. Ingrained characteristics of labour policy by 
themselves are sufficient for this seizure. There is, for example, a long 
history of faith in tripartite approaches. Tripartite approaches hâve run 
the course of Canadian labour policy without the blessing of analytical 
support. The easy logic of the approach discourages analysis. Three-
way représentation is a key-stone in conciliation processes, labour rela-
(28) A.W.R. CARROTHERS, Professor of Law, University of British Columbia, Labour 
Law : Doctrine, Dogma, Fiction and Myth, a paper given before the Mid-Winter 
Meeting of the New Brunswick Branch of The Canadian Bar Association at 
Moncton, N.B., February 15, 1964. 
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tions boards, advisory groups, and even spécial committees to examine 
the législation istelf. 
There is an abundance of literature dealing with the question of 
tripartite boards in the seulement of industrial disputes.29 Discussions 
in the United States hâve slipped conveniently back and forth between 
the concepts of fact-finding and tripartite conciliation boards. Canadian 
expérience offers no such convenience for confusion of terms since our 
boards are specifically tripartite in nature and free, on the surface at 
least, to employ fact-finding, médiation, or any other tool that cornes 
to hand, in an effort to settle a dispute. The major goal of Canadian 
législation has been to provide a supplément to the usual give-and-take 
of collective bargaining. The complain has been that boards, in fact, 
supplant or distort collective bargaining. Analysts hâve been reluctant 
to venture past this point. 
Neither those who favour the tripartite approach adopted in Cana-
da, nor those who hâve been critical in their comments, hâve reached 
into the area of économie effectiveness for support in their position. 
Arguments hâve waged over the économie effects of strikes, the im-
portance of face-saving endeavours, and the broadening of the area of 
search for answers to outstanding issues. But little has been said as 
to whether fiddling with an économie market by way of tripartite boards 
necessarily bolsters collective bargaining as a dimension of the economy. 
Provision of a supplément to the industrial relations market presu-
mably means aiding the decision-making process by innovation in any 
one of an infinité variety of ways. Arbitration would be an extrême 
form of innovation, providing a complète answer. If arbitration is 
rejected as a regular means of settling industrial relations issues, and it 
is by most analysts, then the question concerns the degree of innovation 
best suited to industrial relations markets and whether boards will do 
the job. 
Tripartite approaches are necessarily conservative in character. It 
would be unusual for ^three parties, representing three separate sets of 
backgrounds, to join in a conspiracy of innovation. The représentatives 
(29) See for example the interesting exchange between Professer Northrup and 
Dean Lazar in Industrial Relations — A Journal of Economy and Society, Univer-
sity of California, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 125-131. 
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of the two parties are conscious of their place in a lengthy bargaining 
process. The chairman, most often appointed by government, is at once 
coveted and disowned. He becomes released and bound by his posi-
tion of neutrality to the point of becoming an innovator who is limited 
to choosing within the range of two positions, or two vested interests, 
which could scarcely be called innovation. 
Chairmen hâve two avenues open to them. They may be legalistic 
and adhère closely to rules of évidence, in which case they add only 
their judgments to those of others. Or they may médiate, which more 
often than not involves innovation only to the extent of facilitating a 
face-saving process. Conciliation board reports reveal only limited in-
novation. The supplément to collective bargaining provided by tri-
partite efforts can scarcely be more than an extension of bargaining 
within an ultra-conservative forum. The purpose of supplementing or 
adding to the bargaining process is, at best, only partially achieved. 
Reliance on answers upheld by two or more of the parties is almost 
uniquely Canadian. Plagued by vagueness of purpose and a basically 
illogical approach to innovation, the tripartite approach is difficult to 
evaluate in other than industrial relations terms. Yet available analyses 
are far from neo-classical in approach. A fair consensus reveals that the 
core of concern is to define the most effective and the realistic limits to 
the support for bargaining. 
Conservatism is not only injected by the law at the dispute stage 
but also through the many administrative processes employed to make 
labour law operational. Even such basic functions as the interprétation, 
and often the setting, of ground rules is subjected to three-way décision 
which it is difficult to believe encourages innovation any more than 
boards. 
Policy Innovation 
Economie theory offers little aid in conceptualizing industrial 
relations. Difficultés in marrying national policy and bargaining ob-
jectives lead the economist to assign a causal, rather than a contributory, 
rôle to bargaining in the working of the economy. The word «res-
traint» appears in many différent garbs throughout the literature. 
Government policy in the United States at the fédéral level in 
récent years reflects attempts to cope with the limited knowledge 
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available to balance national économie policy with actions in industrial 
relations issues. The period of the Kennedy administration brought 
attention to the concept of guidelines. Expression was given to many of 
the diverse aspects of labour policy in the Présidente earthy reactions 
to events in the steel case. Running through the events of the time was 
the assumption that bargaining would play its part in the economy if 
wages and benefits were kept in line with changes in produetivity. 
It has been suggested that those concerned with the responsibilities 
of the administration in the labour field and those charged with the 
task of defining the broad outlines of monetary and fiscal policy differed 
in their views as to the appropriateness of guideposts.30 The Council 
of Economie Advisors were serving notice that bargaining décisions had 
significance in national économie policy. The labour specialists must be 
forgiven some appréhension at the request that they carry a measure 
evoked by analysis at the national level to the atmosphère of the; bar-
gaining table. Tools in the form of an understanding of the meaning 
of national policy for bargaining are simply not available. Even the 
original document of the Council referred to qualifications and, indeed, 
the emergency disputes of 1962 forced the administration beyond its 
own guidelines.31 The point to be made is that national économie policy 
in the United States was required to grapple with the telling jibes of 
collective bargaining. Opposition to guidelines expressed by manage-
ment and labour should not obscure the value of the touchstones the 
guidelines hâve provided. Most récent among the critical statements 
has been the indication of the executive council of the A.F.L. - C.I.O. 
that member unions will not follow policies in keeping with the guide-
lines. But there is cause for reflection in Ewan Clague's findings which 
show the over-all level of wage and salary increases in the U.S. in the 
past five years has not been significantly greater than produetivity 
gains.32 
Labour policy in Canada, in contrast to the United States, has 
steered a strange and uncharted course through industrial relaitions. 
Rather than confront issues of translation from one level of économie 
or social understanding to another, Canadian policy is rationalized in the 
( 30 ) See comments of James Stem in « Symposium : Labour Relations and the 
Kennedy Administration», Industrial Relations, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1964), p. 24. 
(31) Ibid., p. 25. 
(32) CLAGUE, EWAN, Automation — The Economie Perspective, Washington, 
mimeo., 1963. 
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difficulties of politics in a fédéral state and flounders in the backlash 
of ad hoc expéditions into, and ont of, the area known as industrial 
relations. The impressive list of such activities runs a lonely course 
from the sorties of the conciliation process, which once initiated seems 
to live the life of a disowned disciple of peace, to acts of seemingly un-
impeachable altruism in the form of minimum wages or maximum hours. 
The gossip of the industrial relations world bristles with stories of 
the extent of improvised policy made to cope with urgencies of the 
moment and without the advantage of référence points other than 
minimizing overt conflict. The law in Canada hides the extent of 
improvisation, by including wide areas of administrative décision without 
at the same time providing more than the broadest of policy indica-
tions. It seems likely that the admonition to « endeavour to bring about 
an agreement between the parties to a dispute» has as many inter-
prétations as interpreters. One has the feeling that the term « trade-
union » achieves operative meaning which is more rigid than the word-
ing of some Acts and more indefinite than others. 
The course is indisputably lonely for industrial relations. Nego-
tiations and unions suffer, at the hands of the analyst and the politician 
alike, treatment reserved for the tolerated guest in place of that afforded 
a participant in decision-making. 
Policy-makers in Canada reap freedom of action from the failure 
of the analyst to show the importance of a functioning industrial re-
lations System. Concentration on fiscal and monetary analysis has so 
occupied the académie that the niche for labour analysis in new-found 
knowledge has been neglected. Académie disinterest and inadéquate 
public policy grow together. 
So far approaches to firming up labour policy hâve been limited 
by knowledge. The economist, for example, has blunted his tools of 
analysis by branding hours or wage rates or even the supply of and 
demand for labour as discrète séries having the good sensé to fit the 
techniques of analysis developed for price séries. It has become almost 
predictable that the economist will list the vagaries of industrial relations 
among the potential modifiers of theoretical analyses. The labour 
economist has tended to support the position by insisting on the unique 
nature of almost every venture into the industrial relations field. 
Inept concessions are made by the analyst, as for example in re-
moving the influence of strikes from employment statistics. But grapp-
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ling with national policy at the industrial relations level is lacking in 
académie endeavours. There are few other places in the économie 
structure of the economy so heavily regulated by law and yet without 
meaningful intégration into the totality of the économie thought. Cana-
dian policy-makers put forth almost as the lone pièce of constructive 
national policy in industrial relations that there shall be collective bar-
gaining. This décision is far from firm, being largely permissive. At 
times even this résolve appears to hâve wavered.3a 
The real question is whether or not expectations of any better labour 
policy are practical. Purposes, structures and rules of the game are 
not easy, or even possible, to define or verbalize on the basis of ex-
périence limited to the pursuit of agreement almost at any cost. 
So far the labour analyst has limited his efforts to move forward to 
recommendations in the more carefully developed fields of monetary 
and fiscal policies. Without entring the intriguing area of explaining 
the widespread acceptance given the économies of monetary and fiscal 
policy, it is important to point to the growing efforts to fit labour 
issues under the umbrella of monetary and fiscal conclusions. This 
represents a doubtful circumventing of the need to appraise the re-
quirements of industrial relations and the economy. 
Bargaining in a constructive fashion or filling out the labour-
management relationship is an unlikely product of tax rebates. 
Financial incentives and virtually unrestricted capital formation 
may or may not solve structural problems in the labour force. Dé-
monstration that the négociation process wobbles uncertainly on its 
présent base will not likely lead politicians and civil servants to change 
their ways. 
Conclusion 
This paper has been one of assessment. ït clearly commands silence 
of the author in the future unless he can cope with some of the issues 
raised or is seeking to become the Cassandra of the labour field. In 
(33) E.g., Case No. 211 of the Committee on Freedom of Association of the I.L.O. 
See p. 30 of the Minutes of the 151 st Session of the Governing Body for con-
clusion reached in the case. 
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défense of the paper it should be noted the CIRRI sought views on gaps 
in industrial relations research and the meaning for public policy. 
Public policy in this field is largely the produot of steps taken in the 
past to phase a new économie and social instrument into the economy. 
The new instrument in the space of a single génération has found a 
place in the economy. But a récognition that the new-found process 
has now become an established part of the economy has won only a 
gruding admission in policy change. Political expediency has played a 
rôle in forestalling change. But the gap in industrial relations research 
looms large for even the most astute hewer of labour policiés. 
Industrial relations research has an inbred quality which dis-
courages over-all assessment. Evaluation of the give-and-take in 
collective bargaining has its difficultés, but even this complexity grows 
when bargaining is viewed against the background of the opérations 
of the community. Uncertain steps to secure more adéquate contribu-
tions of industrial relations at the level of the individuâl, of the firm, 
of the industry and of the community, are a feature of current bar-
gaining. Such efforts deserve and require better analysis of the relation-
ship of bargaining to the economy. 
Lacking further insights industrial relations will continue to be 
allowed to spin on its own axis at a resticted level of concern. At best 
the process will be submerged in answers of a fiscal or monetary cha-
racter while opérations at its présent level of effectiveness churn up 
only partial questions for considération. 
LES RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, LES LOIS DE RELATIONS 
INDUSTRIELLES ET LES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES 
Il est assez frappant dans le domaine des sciences sociales, ici au Canada, qu'on 
ait semblé négliger les résultats des recherches en relations industrielles, pour 
l'élaboration de la législation qui gouverne les relations du travail. Les législateurs 
ont été peu enclins à introduire dans la loi des modifications suffisamment stables 
donnant aux gouvernements la liberté d'action requise pour faire face aux conflits 
industriels. 
Les analyses théoriques de l'économie ont minimisé l'importance des politiques 
en matière de relations industrielles dans une politique économique nationale. Les 
résultats pratiques, à introduire dans une analyse économique d'ensemble, rendent 
le changement difficile. Il reste encore beaucoup d'analyse à faire pour connaître 
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l'effet de la législation ouvrière sur le marché du travail ainsi que l'effet des acti-
vités de ce marché sur la politique économique. 
La législation ouvrière a ajouté et mêlé des éléments du marché des relations 
de travail de telle sorte que le comportement de ce marché diffère de celui d'un 
marché économique comme on le conçoit traditionnellement. Principalement, la 
structure du marché semble avoir institutionalisé le conflit et limité la possibilité 
d'innover. 
La législation canadienne semble avoir compartementalisé ses propres activités 
à l'intérieur du marché du travail de sorte qu'un nombre d'efforts législatifs se 
poursuivent sur le plan économique sans y retrouver une relation entre eux. Les 
structures syndicales et patronales sont affectées par l'institutionalisation du conflit 
que l'on trouve implicitement dans la législation canadienne. 
Il est nécessaire d'avoir plus d'études sur la façon dont les marchés du travail 
et les relations industrielles devraient être agencés pour être plus efficaces. Ceci 
a été réalisé avec un certain succès en Europe, et on retrouve aux Etats-Unis des 
tentatives dans ce sens. Au Canada, les efforts se sont limités à l'agencement des 
exigences générales des politiques ouvrières à l'intérieur des conclusions tiiées des 
politiques monétaire et fiscale de notre économie. 
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